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Governing the Tele-Semicommons
Henry E. Smitht
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 divides entitlements to network
elements between incumbents and recent entrants. This Article analyzes this
mandatory sharing regime as a semicommons, a property regime which
combines interacting elements of private and common property. The tele-
semicommons exhibits problems of strategic behavior and requires complex
governance rules to abate them. These problems are particularly acute when
they impede needed change in the governance regime. The Article therefore
suggests a greater role for sunset provisions in the mandatory sharing regime.
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 289
I. D elineating Shared U se ........................................................................ 291
A . Semicommons Property ................................................................. 291
B. Commons and Semicommons ........................................................ 297
C . The Tele-Semicommons ................................................................. 300
II. Liability Rules and the TELRIC Semicommons ................................ 302
M. The Dynamics of the Semicommons ................................................... 307
A. The Evolution of Property Rights and the Problems of
G overnance .................................................................................... 307
B. Semicommons Dynamics in the Telecommunications Act ............. 311
IV . C onclusion ........................................................................................... 314
Introduction
That the Telecommunications Act of 19961 was a revolution has achieved
the status of conventional wisdom. Most obviously, the Act ended the system
of rate regulation and attempted to open up local and long-distance telephony to
competition. But it also set up a highly unusual property regime to solve the
problem of bottleneck facilities. In place of traditional rate regulation, the Act
substitutes a system under which competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs)
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School. E-mail: henry.smith@yale.edu. For helpful comments I would
like to thank Sarah Deutsch, Richard Epstein, Doug Lichtman, and the audience at the Manhattan
Institute conference Avoiding a Tragedy of the Telecommons (May 17, 2004). All errors are mine.
I Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
in scattered portions of 47 U.S.C.).
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can normally demand that any incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC) lease
some or all of its network elements on an unbundled basis. If, as is also
normally the case, the CLEC and the ILEC cannot agree, then mandatory
arbitration will set the rates. 3 As for how to set these mandatory rates, thus far
the FCC has been wed to the total element long-run incremental cost
(TELRIC) approach.4
At first blush, there is a potentially tragic commons in aspects of the
network, at least to the extent that the TELRIC prices are undercompensatory. 5
If so, then CLECs can be expected to overuse the unbundled network elements
(UNEs) just as those with unrestrained access will overfish a pond or overgraze
a field. I will argue, however, that many of the difficulties with the
Telecommunications Act system stem from the fact that it sets up a
semicommons, a property regime which combines elements of private and
common property such that the two parts of the hybrid potentially interact with
each other.' Like farmers in the medieval open fields who owned strips of land
privately for grain-growing but in common for grazing, members of a
semicommons, from joint venturers to 1LECs and CLECs, have incentives to
maximize the value of their private property, externalizing costs to the
commons and others' private property. Because each has access to the entire
resource through the commons, high-cost and potentially inflexible governance
regimes are required to prevent strategic behavior.
Part I of this Article introduces the notion of a semicommons. I show that
a semicommons is useful when it allows multiple use, but it can lead to even
worse incentives than either private property or a pure commons. To solve the
problems of a semicommons, property regimes usually rely on costly
governance strategies, which are elaborate systems of use rules. I then show that
the system of forced sharing of UNEs and TELRIC pricing constitutes a
semicommons, one that involves extreme problems of governance and little
place for inexpensive exclusionary rules. Part II explains why governance of the
type involved in mandatory unbundling often leads to reliance on liability rules
2 Id. §§ 251-252, 110 Stat. at 61-70..
3 Id. § 252(a)(2), 110 Stat. at 66.
4 See Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002) (upholding the FCC's
authority to adopt the TELRIC approach).
5 The problem of the commons was popularized and termed the "tragedy of the commons"
in Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), but the commons and its
characteristic potential problem of overuse were first systematically studied with respect to fisheries
by Jens Warming, Om "Grundrente " afFiskegrunde, 49 NATIONALoKoNOMiSK TIDSSKRIFT 495 (1911),
translated in Peder Andersen, "On Rent of Fishing Grounds": A Translation of Jens Warming's 1911
Article, with an Introduction, 15 HIST. POL. EcON. 391 (1983). Jens Warming's analysis,
Aalegaardsretten,. 69 NATtONALOKONOMISK TIOSSKRIFT 151 (1931), was later independently
discovered by H. Scott Gordon in H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property
Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954) and extended by Steven Cheung in Steven N.S.
Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON 49
(1970).
6 Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000).
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rather than property rules. All the problems with forgoing exclusion and
property rules potentially plague the TELRIC pricing regime. In Part III I turn
to the dynamic costs of semicommons governance. I suggest that viewing
mandatory unbundling and TELRIC pricing as a semicommons suggests the
need for some kind of sunset or phase-out provisions to achieve the benefits of
facilities-based competition. If semicommons governance is flexible, over time
a cheaper regime of exclusion can emerge, based on competition between
holders of private property.
I. Delineating Shared Use
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 sets up a semicommons in network
elements. The Act aims to encourage competition in the provision of local
telephone services. To generate competition, the Act establishes a
semicommons, allowing multiple use of existing network elements. But a
semicommons also has characteristic costs, which are evident in the system of
mandatory unbundling and TELRIC pricing. These costs stem from strategic
behavior and the elaborate governance mechanisms necessary to curb it. As a
result, a semicommons presents problems beyond even that of the familiar
tragedy of the commons.
A. Semicommons Property
A semicommons exists when a given resource is governed as a hybrid
between common and private property. In neoinstitutional or property-rights
economics, assets are regarded as collections of valued attributes, which are
costly to measure.7 In a semicommons, different sets of attributes can be subject
to different property regimes, private or common, and the two elements in this
hybrid regime interact with each other. Because users of the private attributes
can impact the value of the common attributes and vice versa, semicommons
have characteristic costs. It sometimes makes sense to incur these costs,
because the semicommons carries with it the benefits of multiple use. Often the
resource could be put to more than one use, but the optimal scale for the two
uses does not match up. Thus, if land can be used for growing trees and for
limited hunting, the scale for an orchard might be much smaller than the tract
needed to hunt a wide-ranging species. Often the multiple use requires access
by both users. Bird watchers and loggers might need access to the same forest.
7 Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J.L. & ECON. 497
(1983); Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & ECON. 27
(1982). Other economic approaches also sometimes break assets into clusters of valued attributes.
See JACK t-IIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 155-56 (3d ed. 1984); Kelvin J. Lancaster,
A New Approach to Consumer Theory, 74 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1966); Sherwin Rosen, Hedonic Prices
and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J. POL. ECON. 34 (1974); George
J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non EstDisputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 76 (1977).
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The "open field" system prevalent in medieval and early modem England
(and northern Europe more generally) is the classic example of a semicommons.
In the open fields, farmers had private property in strips of land for purposes of
growing grain but were obliged to throw open these strips and, together with
other frmers, form one large grazing commons during periods right after the
harvest and during fallow seasons. The open fields thus combined elements of
private and common property. The common property was, like purer forms of
grazing commons in medieval and early modem England, limited rather than
open access; the right of common access belonged only to some subset of the
members of the community.8
Semicommons are widespread today, including the mixture of common
and private property in common-interest communities and the use of privately
owned assets in joint ventures. The semicommons is especially important in
intellectual property.9 Because information is difficult to subject to exclusive
rights and because multiple use of a nonrivalrous resource is desirable,
semicommons are almost inevitable in areas like copyright. In a joint venture,
an asset can be used for purposes of the joint venture, but the joint venturers
may retain certain private uses. As in the open fields there is a problem. of
strategic behavior where the two sets of uses affect each other. Thus, if a patent
or piece of equipment is used in a joint venture, the venturers might skew their
decisions in order to extract benefits for assets over which they retain some
private uses, and dump costs to the assets over which others have retained
private uses. For example, if one joint venturer retains a given patent, that actor
will favor research and development that adds to the value of that patent (and
might oppose, at the margin, research and development that would benefit the
patents owned by other joint venturers). To foreshadow, this type of joint
venture is a voluntary version of the mandatory sharing scheme imposed on the
ILECs by the Telecommunications Act. The network elements that have to be
shared are both common and private. The CLEC has an incentive to use these
elements, to the extent they are underpriced, and to avoid taking on the risk of
making timely investments in new facilities. The ILEC has no incentive to
make the network attractive to the CLEC and will be expected to underinvest
in current and improved facilities.
One condition for a semicommons is that the two elements of private and
common property interact. The problem in a semicommons is that someone
8 For general descriptions of the open-field system, see, for example, WARREN 0. AULT,
OPEN-FIELD HUSBANDRY AND THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY: A STUDY OF AGRARIAN BY-LAWS IN
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (Transactions of the Am. Phil. Soc'y, No. 55, pt. 7, 1965); ERIC KERRIDGE, THE
COMMON FIELDS OF ENGLAND (1992); C.S. ORWIN & C.S. ORWiN, THE OPEN FIELDS (1938); Joan
Thirsk, Farming Techniques, in 4 THE AGRARIAN HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES 1500-1640, at
161 (Joan Thirsk ed., 1967) [hereinafter Thirsk, Farming Techniques]; Joan Thirsk, The Common
Fields, 29 PAST AND PRESENT 3 (1964) [hereinafter Thirsk, Common Fields].
9 See, e.g., Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1127 (2003); Smith, supra note 6, at 166-67; Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: An
Information Cost Approach (Feb. 7, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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engaged in using the commons may strategically alter his behavior in order to
distribute benefits to "his" part of the commons (the private part of the system)
and steer bads to others' parts. In the open fields these goods and bads were
manure and trampling, respectively. The commons users may then agree to
mutually forbear in a system of use rules-what I call governance. This will be
easier to the extent that the various users' interests and information are similar.
Many of the problems surrounding mandated cooperation under the
Telecommunications Act can be characterized as flowing from a semicommons.
Most clearly, forced sharing decreases the incentives of both ILECs and CLECs
to invest in new and better equipment and in new technologies. This problem
flows from the fact that the infrastructure is no longer a purely private asset.11
For the ILEC, the basic question is, as usual, the rate of return that gives the
right incentive for investment in view of the possibilities that returns will be
low (CLECs will not lease the element) or that returns will be high (when
CLECs will likely use the TELRIC arbitration process). For the CLECs, it is
advantageous to wait and see which type of potential innovations pay off and to
avoid giving up any second-mover advantage.' 2 Resting on the free options
provided by TELRIC is an effort to maximize the value of their existing
bundles of rights and to externalize the costs of generating valuable options to
bundles associated with the ILECs' property. Empirical evidence suggests that
the mandatory sharing regime has dampened investment by both CLECs and
ILECs.I3 When conflicts go beyond investment incentives, claims on both
sides become more difficult to evaluate: the existing users have better
information about efficient uses than outsiders. 4 It goes beyond the scope of
this paper to evaluate these problems directly, but it is worthwhile to point out
that the claims ILECs and CLECs make of uncooperative behavior by the other
side are consistent with the strategic behavior characteristics of a
semicommons.
10 Smith, supra note 6, at 134-38.
11 See Robert W. Crandall et al., Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based
Investment?, 4 TOPICs ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y (2004), at http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/
vol4/ISSl/artl4 (last visited Apr. 16, 2005); Robert S. Pindyck, Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible
Investment in Telecom Networks (Dec. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=480381 (last visited Apr. 16, 2005); see also Allan
T. Ingraham & J. Gregory Sidak, Mandatory Unbundling, UNE-P, and the Cost of Equity: Does
TELRIC Pricing Increase Risk for Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers?, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 389
(2003) (presenting evidence that mandatory unbundling at TELRIC prices increases ILECs'
systematic risk); Thomas M. Jorde et al., Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG.
1 (2000) (analyzing incentives under the FCC's second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
12 See Jerry A. Hausman, The Effect of Sunk Costs in Telecommunications Regulation 3-4
(Oct. 1998) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.mit.edu/faculty/download_
pdf.php?id=258 (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
13 See Crandall et al., supra note 11 (presenting evidence of lessened investment by CLECs
and ILECs); Ingraham & Sidak, supra note I I (presenting evidence of diminished CLEC incentives for
investment).
14 Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1754-90 (2004).
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The problem of "line-splitting" illustrates the incentive of a CLEC,
especially a large one like AT&T in some markets, to impose costs on the
ILEC by requesting arrangements using the most costly parts of the line. 15 On
the one hand, the benefits of competition from CLEC access would be lost if
ILECs can offer the CLECs only inferior services and facilities. On the other
hand, CLECs can externalize costs if the governance structure allows them to
demand unrealistically high levels of performance at no cost and with no
commitment to use the facilities. 16 More generally, unbundling through
structural separation requires complex rules and conduct remedies because the
ILEC still has an incentive to take actions that favor itself over the CLEC, and
the CLEC has no reason to minimize the ILEC's costs (if the CLEC is large
enough, the CLEC may have an incentive to impose unnecessary costs). On a
more mundane level, mandated sharing often requires easements or licenses (as
well as physical improvements and security) for hookup and physical access to
switches. This all requires monitoring to make sure that damage to retained
private property does not occur.
The solution to a semicommons is usually a governance regime rather
than exclusion rules. Property rights can be delineated using various strategies,
which can be ranged along what I have argued is a continuum from exclusion to
governance. 17 Each strategy has its own characteristic costs and benefits. An
exclusion strategy relies on very rough signals, ones that are not directly tied to
use but are very easy to delineate and for dutyholders to process. The fence or
the imaginary line around a parcel of land defining who is on one side of the
line allows the law of trespass (and much of nuisance law) to be about whether
one has unpermitted access and so is a violator, or not. At the other end of the
spectrum is the governance strategy in which property rights are delineated by
picking out and evaluating individual uses (with a signal fully correlated with a
particular use, at the limit). In the context of land, governance regimes can
come off the rack, as in a rule of proper use from nuisance law and zoning, or
they can be custom-made and privately provided through covenants. In a
sernicommons, those with access to some of the resource have access to all of
the resource, at least at certain times. This means that pure exclusion will not
work to prevent unauthorized use. Before turning to a tangible example in the
open fields, notice that for intangible property limited access is particularly
difficult and often undesirable. Limited access requires expensive policing of
particular kinds of uses. In copyright, the semicommons is governed by
complex provisions and doctrines such as fair use, compulsory licenses, and the
merger doctrine. 8
15 Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak, Is Structural Separation of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers Necessary for Competition?, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 335, 346 (2002).
16 See Jorde et al., supra note 11, at 23-24.
17 Smith, supra note 14, at 1728.
18 See Smith, supra note 6.
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In the semicommons of the open fields, the system mixed exclusion and
governance. Exclusion was used for the outer perimeter and for the grain-
growing strips during the non-commons periods: non-commoners were
excluded from the field as a whole, and an individual firmer could exclude
everyone else from his own strips during the grain-growing periods. But during
the commons periods, governance regimes of use-based restrictions applied.
Most prominently, rules called "stints" prescribed limits on the number of
animals, especially sheep, that a landholding peasant was allowed to graze on
the commons.*9 These were based on the amount of land the peasant owned,
and preserved the system from overuse: Garrett Hardin's image of inexorable
ruin "tragedy"-did not obtain in his primary example, the village grazing
commons, which was neither open-access nor tragic.21 During the centuries in
which the open-field system (and other commons) prevailed in England, these
stints and other rules seem to have become more or less stringent depending on
22the intensity of the problem. Other governance rules included limitations on
23
times for grazing, provisions for a common herdsman, and many others.
Governance rules such as these are better at capturing the benefits of multiple
use but are also more costly to delineate in the first place and require more effort
and expertise to police and to obey. Keeping an eye on the activities of a
common herdsman or the trajectory of sheep is much more difficult than
keeping them out altogether.
Because a semicommons involves mixing private and common elements,
the users generally need access to the whole for their common use. This need
for common use means that straightforward rules of exclusion are not likely to
19 See, e g., W.O. AULT, OPEN-FIELD FARMING IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: A STUDY OF
VILLAGE BY-LAWS 123, 137, 141 (1972) (describing stinting of sheep); KERRIDGE, supro note 8, at 77.
Depending on the nature of the animal and the size of the herd, animals could be identified using ear-
marking, brands, or natural markings. See, e.g., MICH. CdMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 287.221-.223 (West
1996) (1883 Act setting forth requirements for branding and disallowing methods such as earmarking).
20 Hardin, supra note 5, at 1244.
21 See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 2-28 (1990); James M. Acheson,
Management of Common-Property Resources, in ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 351, 359 (Stuart Plattner
cd., 1989); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986); see also Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons:
Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 399-400
(1999) (reviewing critiques of Hardin's conflation of the commons with open access).
22 See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN
WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 19, 23-24 (1973) (noting that "manorial regulations grew more
restrictive as land became scarce"); Thirsk, Common Fields, supra note 8, at 7 ("Yet from the
sixteenth century onwards manorial documents contain more and more explicit rules and regulations
about the workings of the system until in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they are at their
most emphatic and lucid."). The first recorded stint, from Newton Longville in 1426, imposed the
restriction of 100 sheep per virgate (yardland), AULT, supra note 8, at 26, which, in Ault's words, was
"not a very severe restriction," AULT, supra note 19, at 47. Stints at that location were reduced to
thirty per virgate in 1509 and to twenty in 1608. Id. at 26-27. For documentation of stints in other
locations and times in England, see id- at 27.
23 See generally AULT, supra note 8. In related work, I have argued that the placement of
boundaries served the function of denying access for those engaging in strategic behavior. Smith,
supra note 6, at 144-54, 161-67.
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be available to protect the private elements from misuses by the commons
users, making governance a crucial aspect of a successful (or at least nontragic)
semicommons. I have argued that the pattern of ownership in the open fields-
scattered long strips-reduced the opportunity for strategic behavior by making
it difficult to "steer" the goods and bads emanating from grazing animals to
particular plots of land.24 But the open-field system was a rare case in which. the
configurations of boundaries made strategic behavior more difficult. Like a
governance regime, this scheme of boundaries was an expensive one, but it had
to be, if this account is correct, in order to deter the opportunism made possible
by the semicommons in the first place. So if the benefits of multiple use are to
be achieved, governance rules will generally be needed. And the more intense
(more consumptive and therefore more conflicting) the uses, the more difficult
that will be.
As in a commons, the more semicommons users' interests are
homogeneous, the easier it is to devise governance rules to stop strategic
behavior. Homogeneity of the appropriators lowers transaction costs of
governance rules for both commons and semicommons,15 and lowers the costs
of contracting and organizational forms more generally. 26 Where parties are
similar in their endowments and abilities to appropriate, the same rule can be
applied to all those with access, and each will have the same incentive to reach
an agreement. Where interests are heterogeneous we should expect a commons
or semicommons to be more liable to tragedy.
Heterogeneity of interests is also a well-known obstacle to achieving
agreements to change a common property regime, and this holds especially for
the semicommons. First, governance regimes are particularly costly to modify
when conditions change. Agreement among many owners is more difficult to
achieve than agreement among one or a few owners. The more rapidly the
nature and identity of the uses change, the more quickly the governance regime,
based as it is on rules tailored lo given uses, will become obsolete. Second, in
the semicommons, the ownership of some attributes in private will itself cause
divergent interests among the semicommoners. Again this will make agreement
on change difficult, as the long and fitful history of consensual enclosures
illustrates.
27
24 Id. at 144-61.
25 See, e.g., GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 22-23 (1989).
26 See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 136-40 (1996) (arguing
that the scarcity of marketing cooperatives that handle more than one commodity can be explained by
the importance of homogeneity of interests); Christian Bessy & Eric Brousseau, Technology Licensing
Contracts, Features and Diversity, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 451, 477 (1998) ("Because most industry
members are both licensors and licensees, they have a common interest in building [efficient
supervision systems].").




B. Commons and Semicommons
The problem of a semicommons can be usefully compared to the more
familiar "tragedy" of the commons.' 8 In a situation of open access (or an
unlimited-access commons), each potential user extracts all of the benefits of a
unit of use, say a unit of water pollution in a lake, but will bear only a fraction
of the cost. In the case of n people with access who are equally burdened by a
unit of pollution, each actor bears only 1/n of the cost but all the benefit,
leading the actor to push the activity beyond the optimal point. This can result
in the dissipation of some, all, or more than all the rent from the resource.
29
Unless those with access place use limitations on themselves or are coerced by
an outside authority to do so, overuse and resource collapse are the likely
outcome. Historically, some common pool resources, such as grazing
commons, have avoided tragedy through governance regimes.
A semicommons combines elements of private and common property. As
a commons, the potential for tragedy is there. But there is an additional
problem of the potential interaction between the private and common uses. We
can usefully outline four scenarios, assuming for the moment that the potential
appropriators are homogeneous:
1) A common-attribute user imposes costs on the commonly owned
attributes of the asset. She bears 1/n of the cost of the actions, as
in the commons.
2) A common-attribute user imposes costs on some privately owned
attributes, either (a) her own private attribute, in which case all of
the cost is internalized, or (b) someone else's private attribute, in
which case she bears none of the cost.
3) A private-attribute user imposes costs on private property, either
(a) her own (internalized) or (b) someone else's (externalized).
4) A private-attribute user imposes costs on the commonly owned
attributes. She bears I/n of the costs of her actions, as in the
commons.
These scenarios, which are not mutually exclusive, are like those of the
commons except that in (2) and (3) there is a mix of full internalization and full
externalization. This would be just like the commons (1/n of the cost is
internalized) if all of the cost is internalized 1/n of the time and none of the cost
the rest (I - 1/n) of the time, leading to 1/n of the overall costs of actions being
28 On the standard analysis of the commons problem, see the sources cited supra note 5.
29 See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement?, 50 S.
ECON. J. 438, 441, 447 (1983); see also DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1I 232 (1989) (arguing
that in a rent-seeking model, when one relaxes any of the three assumptions of risk-neutrality,
symmetric positions, or free entry, one can derive a total amount expended on rent-seeking that is
either more or less than the total rent). "Rent" here refers to the stream of benefits that a natural
resource provides without having to be created by humans. Efforts at capture reduce the net value of
the resource.
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borne by the actor. The additional problem of the semicommons comes from
the chance for the user to influence these probabilities: to ensure that
internalization of harms happens less than 1/n of the time by steering harms
away from one's own privately owned attributes, and to ensure that
externalization happens more than (1 - ]/n) of the time by steering harms to
others' private attributes.
Thus, a semicommons presents a basic problem of strategic behavior in
addition to the commons problem. The reason to set up a semicommons is
that multiple use requiring multiple access may be important enough to be
worth the trouble. Often, the reason multiple access is desirable is that two uses
have different optimal scales. In the open fields, for example, grain-growing is a
small event and the benefits and costs can be internalized through relatively
small plots, but grazing is thought to involve economies of scale requiring one
large plot.30 Once we let people use the semicommons as commons-users, they
have basic access to the resource and are in a position to distribute bads and
goods to different parts of the resource. In some semicommons arrangements the
opportunities for such strategic behavior will be slight or easily policed. Thus,
in many indigenous property systems, different families or individuals might
have had rights to pick berries or hunt birds, and these activities did not
interact much (or the interaction was easy to police).3'
Capturing the benefits of multiple use involves regulating users with
access to more of the resource than they privately own. This arrangement
normally makes unavailable many of the cheapest and most effective tools in
property to deal with resource conflict. Elsewhere I have distinguished two
strategies for delineating property rights as lying at poles of a spectrum.32 At
one end is the exclusion strategy in which rough signals not directly tied to use
are employed to protect owners' interests in a wide range of unspecific uses.
The owner of a plot of land can use it for a residence (and as such can cook in
it, read in it, etc.), or can use it to grow plants, or to park cars, or whatever
else. By having a right to exclude, all these use-privileges are protected without
having to be separately delineated by--or even known to--officials at all. By
contrast, a governance strategy uses signals that target specific uses. Thus, a
limit on the number of sheep one can graze or a rule about proper tethering is a
governance rule. So too are real covenants (for example, limiting parcels to
residential use) and zoning.
Crucially, exclusion and governance have different cost structures.
Exclusion is very low cost but as the precision desired increases, exclusion
30 CARL J. DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND: A PROPERTY RiGHTS
ANALYSIS OF AN ECONOMIC INSTITUTION 112-14 (1980); George W. Grantham, The Persistence of
Open-Field Farming in Nineteenth-Century France, 40 J. ECON. HIST. 515, 522-23 (1980); Thirsk,
Farming Techniques, supra note 8, at 188.
31 See Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth Century New
Zealand, 24 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 807, 811-12 (1999).
32 See Smith, supra note 14, at 1741-42.
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quickly gets expensive: think of trying to prescribe proper grazing levels with a
fence. Exclusion is low cost both because officials need not delineate or know
about use directly-owners are delegated authority over this choice-and
exclusion rules are simple and cheap to communicate to the world at large. For
this reason, property has always rested on a large base of exclusion rules.
33
Governance, by contrast, starts out high cost; consider trying to specify every
result of every use conflict between all the pairs of members of society. But as
the stakes of a particular use conflict rise and the precision required increases,
governance becomes the least-cost method of dealing with these particular
resource-use conflicts. Governance rules are used to loosen and moderate the
exclusion rules in these contexts. Special rules for airplane overflights,
34
riparian rights to water, 35 and parts of nuisance law are use rules that serve to
modify but not replace the basic exclusionary regime. As a result, the common
metaphor of property as a bundle of sticks is only partially apt: property is not
36
built up use by use, stick by stick. Building up packages of rights use by use
is the election of an expensive governance regime for all use conflicts. Rather,
much property comes "pre-bundled" so that many use conflicts can be decided
based on who invaded whose rights, in accord with the traditional lay view-
an exclusion regime. As a matter of clear line-drawing and information costs,
some reliance on this approach is almost inevitable.
In a semicommons, those with access to the commons cannot easily be
excluded from its privately owned attributes. Otherwise we could parcelize the
asset into a purely privately owned asset and a commons. Where this is not
possible, a semicommons is only worthwhile if the benefits of the multiple use
are worth incurring the costs of abating strategic behavior (including the
residuum of strategic behavior that takes place despite all cost-efrective
policing). In the open fields this was accomplished in part through scattering
the strips so that strategic picking and choosing was made more difficult. In a
joint venture, rules for what one can do with assets might ameliorate the
problem.
33 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.
965 (2004). For arguments that the right to exclude is important or even critical to the notion of
property, see J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 13 (1996); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN
LAW 70-71 (1997); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 38-39 (1988); Felix S.
Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357 (1954); Thomas W. Merrill, Property
and the Right To Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 747-48 (1998).
34 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1103-04 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Thomas W.
Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 36
(1985).
35 In riparian water law, owners whose land abuts a water course are entitled to make
reasonable use of the water. See, e.g., Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 491 (1842); Carol M.
Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261,
264 (1990).
36 Much of law and economics from Coase onward has assumed an extreme version of the
bundle-of-sticks view. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law
and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001).
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C. The Tele-Semicommons
For regulating assets subject to very intense use and investment, the
Telecommunications Act has opted for a semicommons. Sections 251 and 252
of the Act provide for three methods to facilitate competitive entry into local
telephony, at least two of which move the regime closer to a semicommons.
First, the act requires that ILECs provide interconnection to those who have
competing facilities.37 This requires familiar coordination rules but creates a
semicommons in a weak sense; the two firms with the interconnected facilities
have separate property, and only a limited range of uses need be governed to
provide for interconnection, along the lines of what was required for common
carriers at common law.39 Second, the statute provides for resale by competitors
who have a right to purchase from ILECs at wholesale. 39 Third, and most
controversially, the Act requires that most ILECs make available unbundled
40network elements (UNEs) to competitors. In the course of its decision on
mandating unbundling, the FCC must consider whether a proprietary element
is necessary to the potential CLEC and whether, in the case of other elements,
the failure to gain access to them would impair the competitor in its ability to
provide service. 41 The various attempts the FCC has made to implement
unbundling have all involved it heavily in evaluating the use that competitors
might make of an element-requiring the FCC to create a wide-ranging
governance regime.42 Accompanying detailed governance rules are the rates at
37 47 U.S.C. § 25 1(a)(1), (c)(2) (2004).
38 See James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 225, 251-68 (2002).
39 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(1), (c)(4) (2004).
40 Id. § 251(c)(3).
41 Id. § 251(d)(2). For general discussion, see, for example, PETER W. HUBER ET AL.,
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 5.5 (2d ed. 1999); Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A
Consumer- Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications Networks, 109
YALE L.J. 417 (1999).
42 Under the first set of rules, any decrease in the quality of the competitor's service would
constitute impairment. In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 95-185 (released Aug. 8, 1996),
11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 15,643 285 (1996) (First Report & Order). This approach was struck down in
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd, 525 U.S. 366 (1999), because the FCC did not consider the alternatives
of self-provision or provision by a third party and because the FCC's adopted meaning of "impair"
was too unlimited. The second set of rules substituted a material diminishment standard, In the Matter
of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC
Docket No. 96-98 (released Nov. 5, 1999), 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3725 51 (2000) (Third Report & Order
& Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), but this was found inadequate in United States
Telecommunications Ass"n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Most recently, the third set of rules
adopted a standard based on barriers to entry and adopted a more "granular" approach to impairment
involving deferring some of the determination of impairment to state public utilities commissions, In the
Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers;
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996;
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket
Nos. 01-338, 96-96, 98-147 (released Aug. 21, 2003), 18 F.C.C.R. 16,978 97-98, 118 (2003)
(Report & Order & Order on Remand & Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) [hereinafter
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which the mandatory access must be provided. The Act provides that the
ILECs may charge a "just and reasonable rate" for the UNEs.43 If the CLEC
and the ILEC cannot agree on such a price, then mandatory arbitration is
provided for, and the FCC has opted for TELRIC prices. TELRIC prices are
supposed to be based on the most efficient technology and the lowest-cost
configuration currently available.44
The benefit that the Act seeks to achieve is multiple use-use by both
ILECs and CLECs of the essential or bottleneck facilities owned by the ILECs.
The Act mandates access to these facilities for the CLECs, and simple rules of
exclusion are not possible to deter strategic behavior by the CLECs impacting
the ILECs' otherwise private ownership rights in the facilities. Instead, the Act
must use a governance regime, which is ambitious in terms of capturing the
benefits of multiple use-here the benefits of competition in local telephone
service-but also involves the high costs of delineating and policing individual
uses. Under the simple exclusion strategy, property law delegates many choices
over uses to owners and need not address first-order use questions (for example,
how to use the property, or how much to use it). By contrast, the adoption of a
governmentally-mandated governance regime is a partial withdrawal of this
delegation and foregoes the benefits of the delegation as well.
As in tangible property, the need for dynamic change, especially where
interests are heterogeneous, leads to additional cost in a semicommons. In
telecommunications, this dynamic choice of uses is particularly important in
light of rapid technological change. By not delegating dynamic choice among
uses to an owner, governance requires other mechanisms to allow for change
over time. In the early modem open fields this mechanism was enclosure,
which was a messy and drawn-out process. 45 An important challenge in
telecommunications law is therefore to build in the ability to change
governance systems over time, as through sunset provisions or phase-outs.
Many voluntary governance systems, such as interlocking covenants, build in
such features. 46
Triennial Review Order]. This delegation of unbundling decisions to state utiltity commissions was
struck down in United States Telecommunications Ass "n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
43 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1) (2004).
44 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1) (2005); see also Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S.
467 (2002).
45 See, e.g., THRAINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 221-23 (1990);
E.P. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS IN COMMON 97-184 (1991); YELLING, supra note 27, at 1-10; Robert C.
Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1391-92 (1993); Donald N. McCloskey, The
Economics of Enclosure: A Market Anatysis, in EUROPEAN PEASANTS AND THEIR MARKETS: ESSAYS IN
AGRARIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 123, 142-51 (William N. Parker & Eric L. Jones eds., 1975).
46 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 919-
26 (1988) (arguing that developers have an incentive to use tools of entrenched rights, majority rules,
and compensation for changes, and that law need only fill interstices); see also ROBERT ELLICKSON &
VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 677-87 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing
express termination clauses).
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The unbundling and sharing regime of the Telecommunications Act
mandates a semicommons of the heterogeneous sort. The ILECs have basic
ownership of the local networks. But CLECs have a right to demand access to
some or all of the network elements at what are in effect officially determined
prices, under the TELRIC regime. For the shared elements, the entitlement is
split between the ILEC and the CLEC. In such a situation we have at least
three classes of problems.
First, and most obviously, there is the commons-like aspect. Governance
rules are needed. Rules setting out the terms under which interconnection and
sharing of the network elements occur are governance rules, because they
regulate behavior in a partially shared resource. Government-mandated
governance rules are often paired with official prices; where individual uses are
being regulated, officials may try to harness private information (for example,
about user valuation of the resource) by "pricing" the use through damages
from marginal external harm. Official prices are rules designed to induce proper
use. If these prices are undercompensatory, overuse of the resource will be
likely. This is no different from a commons or any other resource conflict in
which some portion of the cost of use is externalized.
Second, as in the scenarios outlined in (2) above, the commons user can
use the commons in such a way that it imposes costs on the privately owned
attributes. Thus, in the context of the Telecommunications Act, a CLEC could
impose costs on its (now) rival ILEC by making requests to use the network as
onerous as possible; certainly there is no incentive to reduce the impact of such
requests on the part of the network not leased under the sharing regime.
Regulators have to be on guard against this type of behavior because of the
incentives in a semicommons, where the commons-user is not excluded from
the privately owned attributes: she has the opportunity to impose costs on
them (and would generally do so if it results in even a small private benefit).
Third, the private user has an incentive to dump costs on and withhold
benefits fiom the commons. Any investment in or activities involving the
privately owned attributes that improve the commonly owned attributes are
externalized to the extent they are not impounded into the officially determined
price. Neither an ILEC nor a CLEC has an incentive to improve or build
facilities to take pressure off elements that bear the sharing under the current
regime. 7
Il. Liability Rules and the TELRIC Semicommons
Mandatory sharing of assets usually involves not only governance rules
but also protects entitlements through officially determined prices, or "liability




rules" in Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed's famous framework.
According to Calabresi and Melamed, an entitlement is protected by a property
rule if the remedy for its violation forces a would-be taker to bargain for a
voluntary transfer. Under a liability rule, the potential taker can unilaterally take
the entitlement as long as he pays officially determined damages. The scheme
of TELRIC pricing under the regulations pursuant to the Telecommunications
Act is a form of liability rule. A CLEC that wants to use elements of an
ILEC's network does not fhce a veto by the ILEC as an entitlement holder.
Rather, the CLEC is entitled to access at a nonmarket price.
Governance schemes often require liability rules, but liability rules are not
as common as recent commentary suggests they should be.49 When an owner
has property in an asset the law in effect delegates decisions over a wide range
of uses to that owner; absent special intervention such as zoning or regulation,
the law thus restricts itself to a basic second-order delegation to owners of first-
order choices among-and investments in-uses of assets. This higher-order
choice to delegate lower-level choices among uses, characteristic of an exclusion
regime, is usually paired with property rules. An exclusion regime relies on
on/off signals like the crossing of the boundary around a parcel of land or the
almost equally bright-line signal of any use of personal property. The regime is
not designed to put actors in equipoise: the message is to keep off. Liability
rules tend to weaken this scheme of delegation-through-exclusion and to forego
the large information-cost advantages of exclusion and property rules.
By contrast, much of recent law and economics prefers liability rules." As
I argue elsewhere, this is in part because a great deal of economics rests on the
52assumption that uncertainty can be assimilated to risk. Frank Knight noted
that some but not all variability in outcomes can be captured by a probability
distribution, which is the familiar notion of risk . But he distinguished from
risk other variability in outcomes that cannot be quantified in this way, and
termed this uncertainty." As an example of risk, consider an asset that is worth
48 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
49 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995) (arguing that liability rules facilitate
bargaining); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); see also A. Mitchel Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and
Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
1 (1979) (comparing property rules, liability rules, and tax subsidies, and using proposed framework to
rank approaches under various conditions). The literature advocating a liability-rules solution in
particular contexts includes a wide range of situations in which holding out and other strategic
behavior are thought to be severe. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and
Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 452 & n.44 (1995) (describing
a survey of legal literature from 1975 to 1986 in which some dozen proposals for liability rules in high
transaction costs settings were proposed, and giving examples).
50 See Smith, supra note 33.
51 See supra note 49.
52 See Smith, supra note 14, at 1725-28, 1753-90.
53 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-21, 197-232 (1921).
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$100 with 75% probability, and $40 with 25% probability. The asset's
expected value is the sum of the values discounted by their probabilities: (.75 x
$100) + (.25 x $40) = $85. There is risk but no uncertainty because there is
knowledge of all the possible states, their probabilities, and their pay-offvalues.
If the value of the asset were uncertain in Knight's terminology, some or all of
this knowledge would be missing. Knight argues that it is uncertainty that
gives rise to the role of the entrepreneur.14 The entrepreneur has some advantage
in dealing with uncertainty. Much of economics assumes that assets and
activities, including harm-producing activities, can be grouped into sensible
actuarial classes, like the asset above." If so, then liability rules are attractive
because the government price can be set on the basis of known probabilities and
values of outcomes-using information known to or knowable by all.5 6 As
long as the liability level is not systematically biased and the actor on whom
the liability falls is risk-neutral (which is often thought to be true in a
commercial context),57 then inaccuracy in actual liability is fine as long as the
expected liability and the expected harm to be internalized are equal.
This neat picture breaks down in the face of uncertainty, and property rules
can be seen as a response to uncertainty. 58 First, delegation of first-order use
choice to owners has the benefit of allowing judges and other officials to be
ignorant of the value or even the identity of possible uses, much less the
highest-value uses of assets. Officials therefore need not have the kind of
knowledge that would turn uncertainty into risk as long as exclusion and
property rules play a large role in defining and protecting entitlements.
Exclusion and property rules solve the basic uncertainty problem, because
prices can be set in a decentralized fashion by market participants.
In the face of uncertainty we also have to worry about the incentives of
potential takers and owners to exploit judicial uncertainty. If takers can
anticipate the level of liability that will be associated with taking various
54 Id. at 264-90; see also ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS
(1985) (arguing that entrepreneurs' alertness in situations of uncertainty drives the competitive
process).
55 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 312-13 (1994). As Dan Ortiz points out in his response to Kaplow's article,
this kind of actuarial information is not easy to come by and, as in insurance problems, leaves room for
moral hazard and adverse selection. Daniel R. Ortiz, Neoactuarialism: Comment on Kaplow (1), 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 403,403-06 (1994).
56 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 49, at 719 (arguing that liability rules are superior to
property rules in a wide range of situations as long as liability is set at "the average harm for cases
characterized by the facts the court observes"); see also Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Correlated
Values in the Theory of Property and Liability Rules, 32 J. LEGAL STUD, 121, 135-36 (2003)
(presenting "fixed point result" under which a liability rule is superior to property rules if damages
under the liability rule are set at the mean expected victim value conditional on taker's actual value at
the point where this conditional mean equals taker's actual value).
57 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 550 & n.16 (2003).




assets, they can exploit mistakes in goverment pricing by cherrypicking assets
that are undervalued by the liability rule. 9 This goes beyond the problem of
multiple takings emphasized by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell:' ° it will
cause takers to invest in takings and courts to incur administrative costs to
avoid this problem of opportunism. If the opportunism is not sufficiently
curbed, the prospect of it can cause original owners not to invest in the first
place.61
Likewise, liability rules can lead to inefficient incentives for owner self-
help.62 Owners with valuable assets may find it cheaper to opt out of the
system by defending their assets through secrecy and other measures to make
access by potential takers difficult.
In the context of telecommunications, all these problems with liability
rules are potentially troublesome. In a regime of forced sharing it is less likely
that either party, the CLEC or the ILEC, will have a residual claim protected
by a property rule that would lead it to investment risks in developing uses-
the investor would bear the risk of the investment, but the benefit could be
partially appropriated by the taker. Further, there is a concern that TELRIC
prices, if predictable by CLECs, can lead to cherrypicking of network elements
underpriced by TELRIC.63 And in response, ILECs could be expected to drag
their feet and not to make access easy as they would in a (hypothetical)
competitive market. The complexity of various layers of regulation, from
interconnection agreements to Carrier to Carrier Guidelines and Performance
Assurance Plans, reflects the many costly-to-police margins needed for a
governance regime. 64 In the case of Performance Assurance Plans, which are
meant to ensure access even after the FCC has granted an ILEC permission to
enter the long-distance market, self-executing penalties rely on proxies for
65inadequate service that are complex and still of questionable accuracy. For
59 1 am extending the analysis of cherrypicking in the literature. David D. Haddock & Fred
S. MeChesney, Do Liability Rules Deter Takings?, in THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LIABILITY
RULES: IN DEFENSE OF COMMON LAW LIABILITY 29-30, 33-36, 38-39 (Roger F. Meiners & Bruce
Yandle eds., 1991) (arguing that market damages leave exchange value unprotected); see also
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 49, at 757-73 (arguing that unbiased damages can lead to multiple
takings in the case of tangible things).
60 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 49.
61 Ideally one would want to build incentives to invest into the price implied by the liability
rule, but this would require a great deal of information. Further, it would require that asset classes be
quite small if investment levels differ from one asset in the original liability-rule class to another.
62 Self-help has figured in the literature on liability rules. See, e g., Haddock & McChesney,
supra note 59, at 38-39; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 49, at 769 (asserting that the problem of takings
in the absence of liability and under liability rules is a matter of degree).
63 HUBER ET AL., supra note 41, § 5 5.3.3.
64 See, e.g., New York State Public Service Commission, at http:/Iwww.dps.state.ny.us/
carrier.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005) (on Carrier-to-Carrier Guidelines); N.Y. State Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, Verizon Performance Assurance Plan, at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/ Case_99C0949.htm
(last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
65 See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order, Application by Bell Atlantic New York for
Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act To Provide In-Region, InterLATA
Service in the State of New York, 15 FC.C.R. 3953, 3959, 4164-73 (1999), affd on other grounds,
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example, Performamce Assurance Plans rely on percentage cut-offs for instances
of timely performance on service requests by CLECs, at which point sanctions
kick in. 
66
Sometimes liability rules and governance are unavoidable as tools to
soften the impact of exclusion. In telecommunications the major problem with
an unmodified exclusion regime is that a unitary owner of facilities thought to
have natural monopoly characteristics is in a position to exercise market power
and forestall competition.67 This is the reason a regime of exclusion and
property rules failed to create competition. All responses to this problem,
ranging from traditional regulated industries law to the modem regime of forced
sharing and sharing-based competition, involve heavy reliance on rules of
proper behavior by the incumbent and are often implemented through liability
rules. According to the conventional law-and-economics view, this should not
be so troubling because liability rules are seen as beneficial and the costs of
governance are systematically overlooked. 68 In the (post-)realist world of the
bundle-of-sticks approach to property and heavy reliance on liability rules, the
conventional wisdom approves of this scheme of mandatory sharing. But if
information costs are taken seriously, the foregone benefits of exclusion have to
be taken into account.
The information cost theory highlights two problems. One is when to
shift from exclusion to governance. Elsewhere I have argued that many
commentators and even some recent tort cases have been too hasty in making
(or advocating) this shift. 69 Further, when the shift to governance is made, it is
often important to hem it about with some institutional safeguards such as
hearings in which the would-be taker must justify its project as being in the
public interest and potential takees have a chance to object and propose
alternatives.70 And the point of the institutional safeguards is to make it more
AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Incentives To
Speak Honestly About Incentives: The Need for Structural Reform of the Local Competition Debate, 2
J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 399, 401 (2003).
66 See Performance Assurance Plan: Verizon New York Inc., at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/
47074.pdf, at 105 (Provisions of Performance Assurance Plan); Nuechterlein, supra note 65, at 401-
05.
67 Whether antitrust law is directly applicable to this question is debatable, but traditional
concerns about essential facilities animating antitrust and regulated industries law lie behind the
regime set up by the Act. See, e.g, James B. Speta, Antitrust and Local Competition Under the
Telecommunications Act, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 99 (2003).
68 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View ofThe Cathedral: The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow ofThe Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175
(1997); Smith, supra note 14.
69 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 36; Soith, supra note 33. For an example of judicial
adoption of the stick-by-stick approach, see Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982), holding that
nuisance law applies to access to sunlight for solar collectors and disavowing traditional policies of
property law.
70 , Richard Epstein has argued that liability rules are generally paired with institutional
brakes, even in the Mill Acts, which the liability rule literature treats as a take-and-pay scheme.
Compare Epstein, supra note 68, at 2111-20 (stressing procedural safeguards in Mill Acts), with Ian
Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106
Vol. 22:289, 2005
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likely that such liability rules as are used are really necessary and are not
undercompensatory. As the history of the multiple rounds of litigation over
access demonstrate, it takes a lot of process to decide on the amount of access
for CLECs to UNEs, and it would appear that TELRIC still undercompensates
for incumbent risk-taking. 7' Aside from these problems, there remain other
issues of how to avoid making governance regimes inflexible and static, to
which I now turn.
1I1. The Dynamics of the Semicommons
One of the central problems in the law and economics of property rights is
when to expect "more" property, what more property is, and what additional
property might emerge. Elsewhere I have argued that in some situations the
"more property" that evolves and solves new externality problems can take the
form of more or stricter governance rules rather than simply greater amounts of
exclusion. 72 Once created, however, governance rules are difficult to remove in
favor of radically different regimes, like parcelization. The Telecommunications
Act's semicommons, with its elaborate governance regime, threatens to be
inflexible over time, suggesting some role for devices like sunset provisions.
A. The Evolution of Property Rights and the Problems of Governance
In a landmark article Harold Demsetz argued that property rights would
emerge in response to changed conditions such as rising resource values and
certain types of technological change. 73 Without specifying the mechanisms,
Demsetz predicted that an increase in a resource conflict would lead to the
emergence of property rights. 74 Because he assumed that transaction costs
among those with access to a common resource would always be higher than
the costs of exclusion, Demsetz concluded that rising resource value would lead
to more exclusive rights. He used the example of beaver-hunting territories
emerging among the Native Americans of the Labrador Peninsula in response to
the rise of the fur trade as an example of this process.75 What Demsetz did not
YALE L.J. 703, 742 (1996) (focusing on innovative damages scheme under Mill Acts). See also Smith,
supra note 14. At the least, due process requirements can act as a "tax" on expropriation. See Thomas
W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986). In some contexts, such as
those of necessity, procedural safeguards would defeat the purpose of the liability rule approach. It is
also important that in contexts like necessity we are generally not worried about people strategically
staging necessity in order to be able to take and pay for others' assets.
71 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
72 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S474-84 (2002).
73 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV., No. 2, at 347
(1967).
74 Id. at 350; see also EGGERTSSON, supra note 45, at 249-62; Symposium, The Evolution of
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331 (2002).
75 Demsetz, supra note 73, at 351. The beaver-hunting territories are actually a
sesnicommons because nonowners would have a right to kill and consume beavers for their own
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emphasize is that decreasing resource values should lead to a weakening of
property rights, at least to the extent that ongoing costs and new investments
in property rights can be saved.76 And examples are forthcoming of decreases in
resource values leading to weakening of property rights. For example, decreases
in the value of cattle and horses led to less property-rights activity and
abandonment, respectively, in the nineteenth-century west.
77
I have argued elsewhere that a rise in resource values can lead to an
increase in governance rules.78 For example, a group of grazers can institute or
strengthen stints or a residential community can start adopting more elaborate
covenants as resource values and attendant conflicts increase. Adding to 'the
precision and enforcement of governance rules is one way for the Demsetzian
emergence of more property to take placer
9
Of particular interest in this framework are the apparent counterexamples to
the Demsetzian framework, in which increasing resource values seem to lead to
less property, or at least less exclusion. Theoretically this could happen if the
rise in the value of the resource increased exclusion costs faster than it increased
the benefits of exclusion. Elsewhere I have argued that the conditions necessary
for this to happen are quite restrictive.t 0
Economic change can lead to more property rights-delineated using
exclusion or governance or something in between-but it can also affect the
relative reliance, on these strategies. One of the chief advantages of exclusion is
that it allows officials and other third parties to avoid having to know about
uses (or even their identity). If uses of information become more multiplex and
more uncertain, the advantages of delegating the choice of which uses to
develop, as through further research and development and commercialization in
particular, also increase. 8 If so, then technology also pushes in the direction of
consumption. See Smith, supra note 6, at 143 (analyzing rights in beaver hunting territories as a
semicommons); see also John C. McManus, An Economic Analysis of Indian Behavior in the North
American Fur Trade, 32 J. ECON. HIST. 36, 38-39, 46, 51 (1972) (documenting the complex of
property rights in beaver hunting territories and noting evidence of strategic behavior).
76 On the capital costs of setting up rights and marginal costs of holding them in further
periods, see David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S545 (2002).
77 Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American
West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 170-71, 172-76 (1975).
78 Smith, supra note 72.
79 See id.; see also Cheung, supra note 5, at 64; Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental
Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9-36.
80 Smith, supra note 72, at S478-86.
81 Recently, it has become conventional that in intellectual property, an increase in the value
of the resource should lead to less exclusion. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESsiG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 161 (2001) (contending that enclosure
propertizing information by media and software companies is stifling innovation in the New
Economy); SIVA VAIDRYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003)
(arguing against increased propertization of intellectual property law at the expense of the public
domain). Because information in particular is nonrivalrous and may often have network effects, new
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more exclusive property rights. Technological change can lead to more or less
exclusion (and governance) depending on whether it raises the benefits of
multiple use slower or faster than the costs of officials delineating governance
rules.
Thus, rising benefits of multiple uses do not inexorably point to a
semicommons, much less a government-mandated semicommons, or even
towards more reliance on the governance strategy. In the context of
telecommunications, governance aims at benefits flowing from multiple use of
network elements, but this strategy also entails higher costs of misuse, strategic
behavior, and efforts at controlling such activity. Which effects dominate-on
the benefit or the cost side-is an empirical question. Often in cases in which
the question is whether to delegate under the exclusion strategy or to regulate
(govern) use more directly, the second-order choice has to be made without a
lot of direct information about the value of uses or the costs of capturing them
in governance rules. The whole point of the delegation is to avoid gathering
information. It is suggestive, though, that in cases where uses interact and
measurement problems are great we do find a good deal of reliance on
exclusion. If the type of tasks required under the Telecommunications Act were
not so costly, we might expect greater use of government pricing in other
contexts where exclusion leaves something to be desired, for example in patent
law. Even specific performance in contract law can be seen as a way of escaping
the problems of valuation of performance under contracts. Further, growing
evidence does suggest that the costs of governing the tele-semicommons are
82substantial . If these costs are larger than anticipated, it is worth trying to rely
less on governance in the long run.
Governance is also costly in that it is difficult to change. In systems of
governance, changing the governance rules or abolishing them altogether can
require the consent of too many parties. This is a classic holdout problem and
leads to anticommons-style problems in the domain of transfer, where so many
parties have veto power that economically beneficial transactions do not
occur. 83 The holdout problem may not lead to underuse; many people may
have the right to use. But changing the pattern of use requires assembling the
consent of many parties. The problem is magnified when those whose consent
is required have heterogeneous interests.84 This is a familiar problem in
political and economic organization; in property it comes through especially
clearly in common-interest communities. In a condominium complex, for
technologies are making exclusive rights less sensible, and many scholars call for tightening limits on
intellectual property rights in contrast to the propertization trend they see in the law, This may be true
on the benefit side, but exclusion also has advantages on the cost side. See Smith, supra note 6,
82 See supra note II and accompanying text.
83 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, IlI HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Clifford G. Holderess, Joint Ownership and
Alienability, 23 INT'L REV, L. & ECON. 75 (2003).
84 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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instance, developers will generally "build in" amenities either physically (say,
by building the swimming pool) or in the original charter and will leave for
later voting only issues that either require flexibility or do not involve
heterogeneous interests and the potential for oppression of one group by
another.85
When a governance regime has outlived its usefulness we need flexibility,
but this is difficult to achieve if the participants are many and especially if they
have divergent interests. In the case of the open fields, when economic
conditions favored enclosure, it was not easy to move from one regime to
another. The enclosure process was slow and costly and in many cases
involved simply disregarding older rights of use.
86
Change from one regime to another is easiest when a unitary owner has
the right to change uses and to contract for new rules or a transfer of the
resource. When multiple parties are involved because of parcelization (smaller
chunks of the resource protected by exclusion) or governance (a commons or
semicommons in which many have access, subject to use rules), changing rules
or regimes can be costly.87 One reason that changing from a governance regime
to something else is particularly costly is that the rights of use are likely to be
hard to value-so splitting the rights equitably is very difficult.88 In the
familiar situation where a project requires the assembly of multiple parcels,
there may have already been markets in individual parcels to which reference
can be made. This is the usual source of evidence in the award of just
compensation in a condemnation proceeding. 9 Where there are a lot of
governance rules, use rights have to be valued, though there may not be an
active market for the use rights themselves. One reason rights fragmented on the
basis of use are difficult to value is that markets in use rights are difficult to
establish: so much depends on the identity of the user and the particulars of the
use that valuation becomes costly-finding comparable market prices for
individualized use rights is a haphazard analogical process. Indeed one reason
for a judicial regime of governance in particular, say in riparian rights, is that
85 Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, The Allocation of Resources by Voting, 105 Q. J. ECON. 745
(1990); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 907 (2004)
(discussing potential problems from heterogeneous interests in common interest communities).
86 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
87 See, e.g., Heller, supra note 83 (fragmentation); Holderness, supra note 83 (assembling
consents).
88 Barzel & Sass, supra note 85, at 752 (pointing out that "harmoriy" in voters' interests "is
relatively easy to achieve in projects that provide only pecuniary benefits, but harder to achieve when
projects also provide their owners direct consumption").
89 On the use of comparable sales, see United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo
Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 403 (1949). Other approved market value methods include the
capitalization and replacement-cost approaches. See Clyn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensationfor Takings:
How Much Is Just?, 42 CATm. U. L. REv. 721, 727-29 (1993).
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private transacting is not likely to occur.90 Thus changes that involve dividing
up use rights under a governance regime are particularly costly. Dividing
condemnation awards becomes more difficult as we move from single parcels.to
the question of condemning easements and covenants, or splitting
condemnation awards between landlord and tenant. Even more difficult is
splitting an award between a present possessory interest holder and holders of
future interests. 9' There is not much of a market in future interests, particularly
in the charitable public goods context, so there is little basis for setting the
compensation for the holder of a future interest. 92 In the semicommons, a
change in which use rights are bought out is likely to be difficult. In enclosure,
rights of use not appurtenant to land are difficult to value and are the rights least
likely to be respected, often creating great hardship to those who depend on
them.
B. Semicommons Dynamics in the Telecommunications Act
In the case of mandatory sharing in telecommunications, the 1996 Act and
the FCC envision eventual facilities-based competition. 93 From a CLEC's
point of view, building an alternative facility will only make sense when this is
more attractive than the sharing regime. As many have pointed out, this will
not happen under mandatory sharing if the sharing regime is underpriced.
94
Alternatively, because the semicommons here is a creature of the
Telecommunications Act, the regulations could be changed. But such change
will be difficult and costly because of the heterogeneous interests at stake and
the difficult information problems (especially valuation) that use rights under
the current system present. Any agreement to "buy out" use rights in these
arenas would have to deal with the problem of valuation. Indeed, just these
problems have arisen in copyright, another compulsory licensing regime in an
area with network benefits. Copyright law has a number of statutory
compulsory licenses, and however much sense these might make in a static
world, they are very difficult to change once they are in place.95 A statutory
90 Cf Rose, supra note 35, at 285 (arguing that as in Merrill's account of nuisance,
judgmental as opposed to bright-line rules will be used where transaction costs are high); Merrill,
supra note 34.
91 See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent Domain: Valuing
and Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord and Tenant, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1083
(1987).
92 See, e.g., Ink v. City of Canton, 212 N.E.2d 574 (Ohio 1965).
93 See, e.g., Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers, 16 F.C.C.R. 22,781, 22,786 9 (Dec. 20, 2001) ("[T]he Commission emphasized
that 'unbundling rules that are based on a preference for development of facilities-based competition
in the long run will provide incentives for both incumbents and competitors to invest and innovate, and
should allow the Commission to reduce regulation once true facilities-based competition develops."').
94 See, e.g., J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AN) THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT 460 (1997); Crandall et al., supra note 1 .
95 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
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compulsory license involves heterogeneous interests and uses that are thought
to be associated with high transaction costs in markets; at least, that is their
justification in the first place. 96 These very factors make compulsory license
regimes difficult to change over time in response to changed conditions.
One solution to the rigidity of governance regimes is to build a sunset
provision into them or to phase them out.9' Private governance regimes do
seem to be sensitive to this concern: under conditions of voluntary entry and
good information, people tend to opt for governance over exclusion of a given
resource when the need for flexibility is low (change in use is unlikely) or the
regime comes to an easy or automatic end. 98 If one doubts that conditions will
remain stable or if the benefit of long-term reliance on the particular governance
regime is not too great, a sunset provision or other phase-out can ameliorate the
rigidity. 99 For example, in the area of real covenants, developers sometimes
specify that certain provisions will last for only a certain length of time, or
require a renewal by majority vote at some time in the future. 10 Sometimes
statutes prescribe these devices off the rack, although such provisions should
rarely if ever be mandatory.
In the case of the sharing regime in telecommunications, the system is
mandatory because of fears of market power, but here too one could avoid the
rigidit of governance by adopting some form of sunset or phase-out over
time. The most effective but most difficult way to accomplish this would be
to amend the statute. Alternatively, the implementation of the "necessary" and
96 This classic justification for liability rules goes back in part to Calabresi and Melamed, at
least for the case of large numbers and free riders. While Calabresi and Melamed recognized that
high transaction costs were a factor arguing for liability rules, they recognized that liability rules
presented their own problems. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 48, at 1107-08. As Krier and Schwab
point out, subsequent literature came down much more categorically for liability rules in such contexts.
See Krier & Schwab, supra note 49, at 450-51 & n.39.
97 For an insightful exploration of how sunset provisions could be justified and implemented
under the 1996 Act, see Thomas J. Hall, The FCC and the Telecom Act of 1996: Necessary Steps to
Achieve Substantial Deregulation, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 797 (1998).
98 In some cases, parties or the law will furnish exit options from semicommons and other
governance regimes. For example, co-ownership can be wound up unilaterally if either party seeks
partition. 4A RicHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 607, 618(2) at 50-43 to 50-61, 51-
20 to 51-21 (1995); cf Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549
(2001) (arguing that the costs of governance in co-ownership need not be great but also arguing for an
important role for exit).
99 Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal,
Ill YALE L.J, 1665, 1676 (2002) (arguing that "[s]unset clauses are the mirror image of entrenching
clauses and might also be said to control the authority of later legislatures"), with John C. Roberts &
Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and
Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1784-85 (2003) (arguing that sunset provisions do not bind later
legislatures because the later legislature is always free to reenact). Everyone seems to agree that
reenacting a law is often difficult, and these practical difficulties represent a cost if it turns out that an
extension of the law would have been desirable.
100 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
101 The FCC concluded that a sunset provision after five years of mandatory cellular resale
would promote network building. See In the Matter of Petitions for Rule Making Concerning Proposed
Changes to the Conisnission's Cellular Resale Policies, CC Docket No. 91-93 (released June 8, 1992), 7
F.C.C.R. 4006, 4010 (1992).
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"impairment" standard could incorporate a strong enough view about the
possibilities of alternative facilities (built by CLECs or supplied by alternative
means such as cable) that the semicommons would not be a quasi-permanent
regime. Announcing a hard date for the end of a mandatory sharing regime
would likely call forth its own sets of strategic behaviors and stalling tactics on
the part of lLECs. Instead, given the statutory role envisioned in the Act for the
FCC, it would make more sense either to condition sunset on the achievement
of competition (perhaps from other platforms) or to leave some discretion in the
FCC as to when exactly the sunset will take place.
No sunset provision is foolproof. If it is undesirable to announce a certain
date, then regulators must have at least minimal information in order to wield
the threat of a sunset effectively. How much information is not clear. Thus, if
the regulator could estimate that technological change should make mandatory
pricing unnecessary in five years, the regulator could announce a review at the
end of five years. Or, moving from rules to standards, the regulator could wait
for information to develop and then evaluate the ILECs' and CLECs' behavior
and continue or terminate TELRIC pricing on the basis of ex post evaluation.
This of course creates greater ex ante uncertainty, but uncertainty whether
TELRIC pricing will continue indefinitely might lower the present obstacles to
investment on both sides. If the ILEC invests it will have an incentive to point
to the innovations as a reason to remove TELRIC, and if the CLEC does not
invest it risks being caught flatfooted in case TELRIC ends. Once again, the
advisability of phase-outs probably cannot be justified beyond the invocation of
practice under similar circumstances in private contracts and other regulatory
environments. 
02
As it turns out, there is some limited but growing experience with phase-
outs in the telecommunications area itself. In its Triennial Review Order the
FCC declined to extend mandatory unbundled access to new fiber optic
investments, 0 3 and this was upheld by the D.C. Circuit as an exercise in
balancing some impairment to CLECs' ability to provide a service against
incentives for ILECs and CLECs to invest in infrastructure.'04 Alternatively,
mandatory sharing could have to be periodically justified under an increasingly
higher standard over time. If a CLEC and an ILEC knew that this was in the
offing, investments that would seem unattractive in light of the semicommons
might be forthcoming in view of the possible change of regime. The
telecommunications area is changing quickly technologically, so that a stable
but rigid semicommons is probably not called for. Instead, some
responsiveness to new conditions is likely to be particularly valuable.
102 Also, for those who are convinced that TELRIC pricing is not worthwhile, phase-outs
represent a compromise between immediate abolishment and indefinite continuance.
103 Triennial Review Order, supra note 42, at 273-77, 288-89.
104 United States Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 578-84 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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IV. Conclusion
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 creates a semicommons, which
requires costly governance. By combining elements of private and common
property, a semicommons can potentially capture the benefits of use by
multiple parties-in telecommunications through limited forms of
competition-but a semicommons usually requires all parties to have access to
more features of a resource than they own. In particular, users in their capacity
as commoners will be able to engage both in familiar overuse of the commons
and in strategic appropriation of benefits and dumping of costs based on who
owns what in the private regime. Nor will users in their private capacity be
inclined to maximize the value of the commons or of others' private property.
In its interconnection, resale, and especially sharing mandates, the
Telecommunications Act subjects unbundled network elements to a
semicommons regime that requires detailed regulations of use, including
government-determined prices. Concerns expressed by commentators about lack
of investment in facilities and cherrypieking are characteristic of a
semicommons. Also endemic to semicommons is their rigidity over time.
When the set of those with interlocking entitlements to a resource must all
agree to a change, the transition from one property rights regime to another is
often beset by familiar problems in bargaining. Because of these difficulties,
governance regimes, from grazing commons and open fields to common interest
communities, are thought to pay for the benefits of multiple, complex use by
incurring the costs of inflexibility. This inflexibility is particularly costly in an
area like telecommunications that is subject to rapid technological change. One
solution to this inflexibility is to build into the statute or regulations a sunset
date or other phase-out device in order to move toward facilities-based
competition. How to implement such a phase out depends on familiar choices
of ex ante certain rules versus ex post standards. The value of flexibility and the
great cost of governance in telecommunications suggest that our regulatory
regime should place greater reliance over time on lower-cost exclusionary
strategies for delineating property rights and less reliance on governing a
semicommons.
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